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Another Oil-Price Shock? 
Most of  the world's major oil exporters are 
located in the world's most politically un-
stable area. So whenever trouble breaks out 
in that area~ worldwide supplies tend to be 
seriously affected and prices shoot skyward. 
Prices quadrupled following the 1973 Middle 
East War, and they more than doubled again 
between late 1978 and early 1980 in the 
wake of  the Iranian Revolution. Thus, when 
hostilities broke out last month between Iraq 
and Iran, the industrial world once again 
feared the worst outcome. 
So far, it hasn't happened. As a result of the 
u.s. recession and the impact of past in-
creases in prices, worldwide consumption 
had already slackened in relation to pro-
duction, raising inventories to a very high 
level. Thus, the initial loss of  production from 
the Middle East conflict affected prices only 
to a modest degree, and that situation may 
continue for the remainder of  this year. But if 
the conflict should continue into 1981, world 
oil prices could rise considerably more than 
the 12-to-15 percent originally expected for 
the year. And if Middle Eastern oil should 
disappear completely from the market -for 
example, through a blockage of  the Straits of 
Hormuz-major  oil importing nations could 
be in for another serious oi I-price shock. 
Earlier crises 
The present crisis actually began in late De-
cember 1978, when the revolt against the 
Shah led to the halting of Iranian crude-oil 
exports. This step eliminated Iran's normal 
supply of 5.5 million barrels a day from the 
world market. Other Middle East producers 
quicklyoffset some of  this shortfall, and Iran 
itself partly restored its export potential, but 
the Iranian oil-supply shock nonetheless 
dramatically affected the world oil market. 
The average OPEC-contract price jumped 82 
percent between the fourth quarter of 1978 
and the fourth quarter of 1979, to $23.54 a 
barrel. 
The price surge accelerated in the first quarter 
of th is year, as the OPEC average soared at a 
122-percent annual rate to $28.72 a barrel 
(see chart). This surge was somewhat sur-
prising, because worldwide petroleum in-
ventories were already approaching full stor-
age capacity, consumption had dropped well 
below year-earlier levels, and spot prices had 
fallen substantially below their late-1979 
peak of $42.00 a barrel. However, the wide 
differential still existing between the higher 
spot price and the OPEC contra<;:t price still 
provided the impetus for a further sharp ad-
vance in the average contract price. 
As time wore on, however, the price rise de-
celerated to a 15-percent annual rate in the 
third quarter of  the year. Inventories con-
tinuedto build during this period, and spot 
prices dropped below at least some of  the 
contract prices by OPEC cartel members. 
Indeed, at OPEC's September meeting in 
Vienna, Saudi Arabia was the only nation to 
announce a price increase, and it did that -
only as a means of narrowing the wide dif-
ferential between its own and other nations' 
official price quotations. Other OPEC mem-
bers were unable to post higher prices in the 
face of the worldwide glut, and most an-
nounced plans to cut production during the 
current quarter to help bring supplies back 
into line with demand. 
Throughout the past several years, the energy 
component of  the u.s. consumer price index 
has reflected these movements in OPEC con-
tract prices. ("Energy" includes gasoline, fuel 
oil, electricity and other energy products pur-
chased by consumers.) Energy prices rose 
almost37 percent between the fourth quarter 
of 1978 and the fourth quarter of 1979, and 
then accelerated to a 53-percent annual rate 
in the first quarter of 1980. But the price 
advance then sharply decelerated, with only 
a 4-percent annual rate of increase in the 
third quarter of  this year. (Moreover, the en-
ergy component of  the producer price index actually declined in September). The slow-
down in U.s. retail energy prices reflected a 
weaken i  ng of  energy markets as a resu It of  the 
massive inventory buildup which had oc-
curred in the wake of  the initial price upsurge 
and U.S. recession. 
Effects of conflict 
A new situation was created on September 
21, when hosti I  ities commenced between 
Iraq and Iran. Within a few days, those na-
tions' crude oil exports had been cut off, 
reducing world oil supplies by 3.7 million 
barrels a day -roughly 9 percent of  the non-
Communist world's total consumption. The 
u.s. was not directly affected, but other na-
tions (such as japan, France, and Brazil) were 
heavily dependent on Iraq's normal exports 
of 2.7 million barrels a day, while Eastern 
European nations were heavi Iy dependent on 
Iran's smaller export supplies. 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab 
Emirates took steps early this month to make 
up for at least part of  the loss, by boosting 
their combined output to about 1.5 billion 
bid above the pre-war level. Their action 
reduced the net shortfall resulting from the 
Iraqi-Iranian cutoff to about 2 million b/d-
coincidentally, about the same amount that 
total non-Communist world production had 
been running in excess of consumption. This 
simply meant that worldwide inventories 
would no longer continue to grow as a result 
of excess production, and could decline sea-
sonally during the winter due to the normal 
increase in cold-weather demand. 
Even if  the Arab producers reduced pro-
duction to the pre-conflict level, however, 
worldwide inventories could be drawn down 
for months before shortages developed. 
World petroleum stocks reached a monu-
mental 6.0 billion barrels before the con-
flict-roughly 500 million barrels above 
normal. That excess inventory would offset 
for five months the 3.7-million bid sho'rtfall 
created by the Iraqi-Iranian cutoff. 
Worst-case scenario 
A very serious situation would arise, how-
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ever, if  the world lost access to all Persian 
Gulf supplies. This could happen if  Saudi 
Arabia and other major neighboring pro-
ducers became involved in the conflict, or if 
the Straits of  Hormuz were closed. Priorto the 
conflict, Persian Gulf producers exported 17 
million bid through that 24-mile waterway-
roughly 40 percent of  the non-Communist 
world's total oil consumption. The U.s., 
although less dependent than others, obtains 
about 9 percent of its total consumption from 
that troubled area. 
The U.s. thus would be better able to sustain 
such a cutoff than most other oil-importing 
nations. At the end of September, u.s. stocks 
of  crude and refined products reached about 
1.40 billion barrels, compared with a min-
imum acceptable level of 1.15 billion barrels. 
That excess inventory-in  the amountof250 
million barrels-would offset for six months 
a total loss of Persian Gulf imports, which 
recently have been running at 1.5 million 
bid. The U.S. doesn't live in a vacuum, how-
ever, but rather in a.tightly interrelated world 
market. Any major loss of Persian Gulf  oil 
wou  Id trigger sharing arrangements among 
major oil-consuming nations, and would 
create severe pressure on spot and contract 
prices. 
Actual situation 
In actuality, spot crude-oil prices have firmed 
only moderately since September 24, when 
Iraqi oil disappeared from the market. The 
Rotterdam quotation for Arabian light crude 
has risen from $33 to $37 a barrel, or $7 
above the Saudi Arabian official price. But 
there has been no panic buying, and the 
transactions volume has remained rather 
light. Indeed, the market seems capable, at 
leastthrough the fourth quarter, of  handling a 
2 million bid net loss of supplies. And with 
the situation stabilized at the producer level, 
the energy component of  the CPI cou Id be 
expected to rise at a relatively modest pace, 
although more than the 4-percent annual rate 
of increase recorded during the third quarter. 
Prior to the Iraqi-Iranian conflict, many an-
alysts had been expecting world oil prices to rise about 15 percent during 1981, a rela-
tively modest increase in the context of  the 
past decade. Butthat modest rise could be 
expected only on the assumption' that slug-
gish growth in the world economy, together 
with strong conservation efforts, held non-
Communist oi I demand at about the 1980 
level or lower. Moreover, prices could sky-
rocket, if  the Middle East conflict continued 
for a prolonged period, or if Iraq and Iran 
were unable to bring their damaged facilities 
back into production within a short period of 
time. 
In the worst-case situation, the industrial 
nations cou Id experience a complete cutoff 
Energy  Prices 
of all Persian Gulf  exports, and OPEC con-
tract prices could reach perhaps as much as 
$100 a barrel within several months' time. A 
supply shock of  that magnitude would cause 
severe economic disruption, force drastic 
conservation, and add several percentage 
points to the u.s. overall inflation rate. Still, 
although the overall situation remains worri-
some, the most striking pointtodate has been 
the adequacy of  supplies and the stability of 
prices in the face of  a destabilizing conflict in 
this crucial area. 
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
Large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total # 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total # 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total # 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
(Large negotiable CD's) 
Weeldy Averages 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves {  + )/Deficiency (  - ) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (+ )/Net borrowed( -) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
6,679  5.0 
8,019  7.2  i 
3,329  10.6 
6,934  16.7 
215  0.9 
751  - 39.9 
1,060  13.9 
280  - 1.8 
3,694  8.3 
3,061  9.6 
441  - 1.5 
8,876  15.9 
8,710  18.5 






Editorial comments may be addressed to the editor (William Burke) or to the author ....  Fr~  copies of this 
and other Federal Reserve publications can be obtained by calling or writing the Public Information Section, 
Federal Reserve Bank of san Francisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco 94120. Phone (415) 544-2184. 